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Executive Summary 
The U.S. Agency for International Develop-
ment (USAID) has enjoyed a long and suc-
cessful orthopedic assistance program in Mo-
zambique. The program, which was 
developed in response to a humanitarian 
emergency, initially provided essential ser-
vices for thousands of Mozambicans disabled 
by the war and its lingering after ef-
fectslandmines. In 1994, with peace at hand 
and the country’s first democratic elections 
successfully completed, the program shifted 
its approach and began to focus on increasing 
the quality and quantity of services in an ef-
fort to develop sustainable practices and 
methods. 
In 1998, as a result of the establishment of a 
new unit within the Ministry of Health 
(MISAU), the Section of Physical Medicine 
and Rehabilitation (SMFR), and recommenda-
tions made in a USAID-sponsored evaluation, 
the program’s focus shifted out of direct in-
volvement in the management and administra-
tion of rehabilitation services and into provid-
ing technical assistance, long-term training 
opportunities, and support to indigenous dis-
ability advocacy groups. The orthoprosthetic 
rehabilitation centers became the direct re-
sponsibility of the provincial and district hospi-
tals in which they were located, and oversight 
was to be provided by the SMFR. 
Since the reorganization of the program in 
1998, the quality and quantity of prosthetic 
and orthotic services has rapidly declined.  
Production in the four main orthopedic cen-
ters has dropped by more than 51 percent. In 
the year 2000, only 309 prostheses were pro-
duced in the country, despite a conservative 
production capacity of more than 1,000 de-
vices per year. The quality of fittings and 
workmanship has taken an equally startling 
turn for the worse. 
Orthopedic services are the responsibility of 
the Ministry of Health, but they are given 
lower priority within the ministry compared 
to other important preventative and curative 
health issues. As a result, little interest is paid 
to these programs, and diminutive resources 
are allocated for them.  
The challenges facing the rehabilitation sec-
tor in Mozambique are not unique. Although 
the MISAU must continue to play a crucial 
role in this health issue and service, ortho-
prosthetics will never be cost-effective 
enough for the government to absorb within 
its current health budget and manage within 
its existing structure. A number of alternative 
management, administrative, and financial 
structures have been attempted in other Afri-
can countries. Several of the more successful 
options are based on public-private sector 
partnerships and oversight boards outside of 
the day-to-day management structure. It is 
incumbent upon the MISAU to further ex-
plore, and in a controlled pilot program, ex-
amine the potential benefits these models 
provide. 
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Introduction 
Through the Leahy War Victims Fund 
(LWVF), the U.S. Agency for International De-
velopment’s (USAID) mission in Mozambique 
has been supporting orthopedic assistance since 
1989. At that time, civil war continued to rage 
and civilian casualties from armed attack as 
well as from landmine accidents continued to 
mount. In response to the need for prosthetic 
and orthotic services, USAID began providing 
support to the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) and later to Handicap Inter-
national (HI) to assist the Ministry of Health 
(MISAU) in developing and operating pros-
thetic and orthotic workshops in five provinces. 
Over time, the program’s purpose expanded to 
include increasing the capacity of nongovern-
mental organizations (NGO) and MISAU to 
provide mobility as well as social and economic 
integration services for people with disabilities. 
Since 1995, Prosthetic and Orthotic Worldwide 
Education and Relief (POWER) has managed 
all orthopedic assistance funnelled through 
USAID. To date, USAID/Mozambique has in-
vested more than $10 million in the rehabilita-
tion sector. 
POWER’s involvement in the orthopedic sec-
tor under its USAID assistance program ini-
tially focused on providing direct manage-
ment and administrative and technical support 
to the provincial rehabilitation centers. Under 
this initial cooperative agreement, the quality 
and quantity of devices produced and services 
delivered increased substantially. In 1998, a 
new cooperative agreement was negotiated. 
Under this agreement, all technical and mana-
gerial oversight and responsibility was sub-
sumed under the MISAU. POWER’s role be-
came advisory, with a small amount of 
financial assistance going toward the produc-
tion of orthopedic componentry. Both the de-
mand and delivery of services has declined 
steadily since the technical responsibility for 
providing orthopedic services was transferred 
to the MISAU. Client satisfaction is low and 
staff morale and motivation is waning. 
As a result of the declining demand and poor 
quality of devices delivered, USAID, the 
LWVF, and POWER determined to conduct 
an external program evaluation. The evalua-
tion was divided into two parts: (1) an ortho-
prosthetic technical review and (2) a feasibil-
ity study on the possibility of having a 
charitable not-for-profit organization manage 
prosthetic and orthetic services. This report 
represents the orthopedic technical review. 
Country Background  
Mozambique has a population of approxi-
mately 18 million (1996 statistics) and covers 
799,380 square kilometres. It is one of the 
poorest countries in world. The gross domes-
tic product (GDP) was estimated at $80 in 
1989 and only $133 in 1995 (MRCS 2000).  
After gaining its independence from Portugal 
in 1975, Mozambique became embroiled in 
civil war. With the signature of the “Accords 
de Rome” in 1992, however, that conflict  
between the Marxist regimes of Maputo,  
Patrick J. Leahy War Victims Fund 
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the Frente de Liberta Vão de Mozambique 
(FRELIMO), and the anti-Communist armed 
resistance of the Resistencia National Mocam-
bicana (RENAMO) ended. The country has en-
joyed relative peace since that time. Although it 
has been dominated by President Chissano’s 
party, FRELIMO, since 1994, Mozambique has 
been governed as a multiparty democracy. 
Mozambique demonstrates a strengthen- 
ing market economy and good economic 
growth despite its remaining problems and 
difficulties. Agriculture production, foreign 
investment, tourism, access to education  
and health services, and civic participation  
in local and national affairs are all on the 
rise. 
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Overview of Prosthetics and Orthotics Services 
Development of Prosthetics  
and Orthotics Services 
During the period when Mozambique was 
ruled by Portugal, the country had only one 
private limb-fitting workshop. This workshop, 
located in the capitol, Maputo, was aban-
doned after Mozambique gained its independ-
ence in 1975. International organizations, in 
collaboration and partnership with the 
MISAU, reinitiated prosthetics and orthotics 
services in the early 1980s as a direct result of 
the need generated from the civil war. 
During the last 20 years, an estimated $25 
million has been provided for physical reha-
bilitation assistance programs in Mozam-
bique. Major contributors include USAID 
(through the LWVF this contribution is more 
than $10 million), the European Union (EU), 
and other agencies. During this period, about 
14,800 orthopedic appliances were delivered 
(prostheses and orthoses) through the nine 
orthopedic centers established and supported 
by ICRC, HI, and POWER. Following is a 
brief description of the various programs and 
projects. 
The International Committee of the Red 
Cross Program (1981–1995) 
In 1981, the International Committee of the 
Red Cross, in collaboration with the Ministry 
of Health (MISAU), began offering prosthet-
ics and orthotics services at the central hospi-
tal in Maputo. The program operated for 14 
years. During this time, the ICRC developed 
the process for manufacturing orthopedic ap-
pliances, local production of orthopedic com-
ponents, and patient gait training. Activities 
included on-the-job training for national staff 
in the different sections. Early in the program, 
an 18-month training program was established 
for prosthetics and orthotics technician’s  
assistants.  
 
Statistics under the ICRC Assistance Program (1981-1995) 
  Maputo 
(1981–1995) 
Beira 
(1986–1995) 
Quelimane 
(1986–1995) 
Nampula 
(1989–1995) 
 
Total 
Prostheses delivered 4,711 1,728 939 815 8,193 
New prostheses patients  2,496 774 648 406 4,324 
Orthoses delivered not reported 287 61 not reported 348 
New orthoses patients  not reported 219 45 not reported 264 
Pairs of crutches 25,964 not reported not reported not reported 25,964 
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Using staff trained under this program, ICRC 
then extended P/O services to the provinces of 
Beira, Quelimane, and Nampula. Before phas-
ing out its program in 1995, the ICRC pro-
vided a formal three-year training program in 
orthopedic technology for 24 national ortho-
pedic technicians. 
Handicap International (1986–2000)  
Handicap International, in collaboration with 
the Ministry of Health, set up two small or-
thopedic workshops in Vilanculos and In-
hambane in 1986 and 1987, respectively. In 
1990 and 1991, HI set up two more orthope-
dic workshops in Nampula (North), which 
produced only orthoses, and Tete (North-
west). Two additional workshops were estab-
lished in Pemba (far North) in 1993 and in 
Lichinga (far Northwest) in 1996. All six 
workshops were attached to district and pro-
vincial hospitals. As part of the MISAU sys-
tem, the centers experienced administrative 
problems and HI had difficulty in raising ade-
quate and consistent funding. 
In 1991, HI received U.S. Agency for Inter-
national Development/Leahy War Victims 
Fund financing to implement a one-year 
training course for orthopedic technicians 
(note: during the team’s visit some of these 
technicians were wrongly said to have 
achieved an internationally recognized Category 
II level). In 1996–1998, HI also implemented 
training for physiotherapy technicians (assis-
tant level) in Pemba. The French Cupertino 
and the British High Commission financed 
this project. Between 1995 and 1996, HI 
provided technical assistance in the 
MISAU’s various other projects, i.e., provid-
ing equipment for and installing physiother-
apy sections in 16 provincial hospitals. This 
effort was funded by the European Economic 
Community (EEC) and from the Canadian 
cooperation and also included assistance for 
patients transit centers and a community-
based rehabilitation (CBR) program, and 
support to the center for the rehabilitation of 
Malhangalene children in Maputo.  
In 1993–1994, HI handed over the responsi-
bility for overseeing its six orthopedic work-
shops to the MISAU. However, HI’s finan-
cial assistance to the MISAU continued. HI 
also provided support for two technical ad-
visers who were posted at the MISAU office 
in Maputo. At HI’s initiative, MISAU cre-
ated a department within the ministry to es-
tablish policy for, supervise, and manage the 
physical rehabilitation programs at the na-
tional and provincial levels. In 1997, an 
agreement was signed and the SMFR (Sec-
tion of Physical Medical and Rehabilitation) 
was officially created. Three HI technical 
advisers were posted full time at the SMFR-
MINSAU office until May 2000. Under the 
HI structured plan, the SMFR became  
 
 
 
Statistic Records under HI’s Assistance (1986-2000) 
  Vilanculos 
(1986–
2000)  
Inhambane 
(1987–
2000) 
Nampula 
(1990–
2000) 
Tete 
(1991–
2000) 
Pemba 
(1993–
2000) 
Lichinga 
(1996–
2000) 
 
 
Total 
Prostheses 
delivered 
579 767 0 256 140 14 (*) 1,756 
Orthoses 
delivered 
514 316 66 (*) 252 281 5 (*) 1,434 
Crutches 
delivered 
2,827 5,541 1,391 (*) 3,443 3,065 250 (*) 9,671 
* Some figures for Nampula and Lichinga are either not reported or missing. 
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responsible for coordinating, overseeing, and 
establishing policy for orthoprosthetics and 
rehabilitation activities. However, the SMFR 
lacked the budget, authority, and credibility to 
play such a crucial role. These failings persist 
today. 
POWER Cooperative  
Agreement I: 1995–1998 
In October 1995, shortly after ICRC phased 
out its program, POWER and the MISAU 
signed a three-year technical assistance agree-
ment. The Leahy War Victims Fund and the 
local USAID mission provided $1,824,276 in 
financing. During this agreement, POWER 
oversaw the activities of the four former ICRC 
orthopedic projects (Maputo, Beira, Nampula, 
and Quelimane). POWER was directly in-
volved in managing these orthopedic centers, 
i.e., controlling the quality of prosthetics and 
orthotics, producing components, managing 
logistics, providing materials, managing pa-
tient’s services, and arranging for training and 
education for P/O staff. POWER also super-
vised the ordering and purchasing of imported 
equipment and materials. 
POWER Cooperative  
Agreement II: 1998–ongoing 
As a result of the establishment of the SMFR 
as well as the recommendations from a 
USAID-funded assessment team, a new 
agreement between POWER and the MISAU 
was signed in November 1998. The Leahy 
War Victims Fund provides total funding in 
the amount of $2,181,024 for this agreement. 
Under this agreement, the MISAU has full 
responsibility for managing the four main or-
thopedic centers. POWER’s role under this 
agreement is advisory (initially done jointly 
with HI) and is based at the SMFR-MISAU 
office. Moreover, under the agreement 
POWER became involved in providing over-
sight visits to all nine orthopedic workshops. 
In January 1999, POWER recruited a certified 
prosthetist/orthotist (CPO), Mr. Ronald 
Doorten, as the advisory monitoring and 
evaluation officer. Mr. Doorten was retained 
full time and based at the SMFR-MISAU of-
fice. In addition, POWER’s obligations under 
the agreement include 
• Funding the acquisition of necessary ma-
terials for the fabrication of orthopedic 
appliances, 
• Managing and administering funds and 
the use of materials in all limb-fitting 
workshops of the MISAU, 
• Managing and collecting statistics for a 
database of patients, 
• Conducting regular technical evaluations 
with the MISAU and national investiga-
tions of the disabled,  
• Financing training of technical staff, and 
• Producing regular activities reports. 
The CPO left Mozambique in 2000 prior to 
end of his contract because of frustrations 
with his job and an inability to work produc-
tively within a governmental bureaucracy. 
Mr. Doorten’s detailed report of findings and 
recommendations is essential reading if one is 
trying to understand the difficulties and dis-
satisfaction he experienced. As a result of his 
departure, some of POWER’s obligations un-
der the cooperative agreement have not, and 
will not, be met.  
The present POWER agreement will be com-
pleted at the end of 2001. In collaboration 
with USAID and the LWVF, POWER would 
like to determine whether the current status 
quo will allow for a productive program or 
whether the MISAU will be receptive to try-
ing a different service delivery approach. One 
option that has been presented to the govern-
ment is the creation of a charitable not-for-
profit NGO that can manage P/O services out-
side of the direct control of the MISAU. 
The Jaipur Limb Campaign Project/ 
Mozambican Red Cross Society  
In 1998, the Jaipur Limb Campaign Project 
(JLP) (based in London, UK) and the  
Patrick J. Leahy War Victims Fund 
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Mozambican Red Cross Society (MRCS) set 
up a not-for-profit service project for ampu-
tees in Manjacaze, Xai Xai province. This 
project began in March 2000. Due to the lack 
of qualified orthopedic technologists and the 
poor skills of resident staff, services have 
been limited to below knee prostheses.  
The newly constructed center has hostel-type 
accommodations with 18 beds and laundry 
and kitchen services. It is a pleasant environ-
ment for both staff and clients. Despite the 
free services and the nice accommodations 
offered the center has rarely had more than 
three patients at any one time since it opened.  
To date, the center has registered 170 and de-
livered 76 prostheses. Follow-up visits to am-
putees are also part of the services the center 
provides. Eighteen patients have been visited. 
The majority of the patients visited live fairly 
close to the center. Follow-up visits to pa-
tients in remote areas are extremely time con-
suming. The JLC-MRCS orthopedic center  
is not included in the MISAU’s national  
program. 
Number of Amputees and  
Causes of Disability 
According to various governmental and non-
governmental surveys, Mozambique has ap-
proximately 9,000 amputees. Including other 
types of physical disability, the total number 
of persons with disabilities affected is in the 
range of 25,000.  
POWER-SMFR statistics from 1997 to 2000 
show an average of 950 new patients per 
year in need of orthopedic appliances. The 
number of patients is approximately 10 per-
cent higher than the present total capacity 
output.  
In 2001, amputations from landmines repre-
sented about 11 percent of all new patients 
attending the orthopedic centers. This number 
is sharply down from 29 percent in 1997. 
Other major amputations reported are either 
from congenital causes or disease. Few ampu-
tations are as a result of motor vehicle or in-
dustrial accidents. 
Current and Potential Capacity of 
Prosthetics and Orthotics Services 
Ten orthopedic workshops are located in nine 
provinces (out of the 10 provinces in the 
country) in Mozambique. Two orthopedic 
workshops are located in the province of In-
hambane (north of Maputo). Manica province 
(west central Mozambique) is the only prov-
ince without a P/O workshop.  
During this evaluation, the team could not 
visit all of the centers. However, the team vis-
ited the centers in Maputo, Beira, Quelimane, 
Inhambane, and Manjacaze. The condition in 
these centers were found to be representative 
of those in all of the centers. The team had 
access to detailed information about the other 
orthopaedic workshops in follow-up reports 
and statistics from the MISAU and POWER.  
The country has a sufficient number of ortho-
pedic facilities for the present. Additionally, 
as noted earlier in this report, over the past 20 
years international humanitarian organizations 
have been committed to assisting in the deliv-
ery of services for people with disabilities.  
Under the POWER/MISAU partnership from 
1995–1998, the number of prostheses deliv-
ered in the four main orthopedic centers aver-
aged nearly 700 limbs per year. This capacity 
was sustained during the period although near 
the end it dipped slightly. During this time, 
orthotic production increased significantly 
and constantly, from less than 200 appliances 
delivered per year to an average of 439 per 
year. Orthotic production peaked in 1998 with 
634 orthoses delivered.  
The output from the other five orthopedic 
workshops (formerly under HI) during that 
same time frame averaged only 145 prosthe-
ses per year. In 1998, it reached a peak of 167 
limbs per year.  
Orthoprosthetic Technical Assessment of POWER’s Programs 
7 
Statistics in 1999 show a quick decline in 
production, which corresponds and is directly 
related to the point at which HI transferred the 
responsibility of the workshops to the 
MISAU. In 2000, only 142 prostheses were 
delivered from the five HI-assisted work-
shops. The decline was most dramatic in the 
four POWER-assisted orthopedic centers. In 
these centers, production dropped by 51.2 
percent. By the end of 2000, only 309 pros-
theses were delivered.  
Combined output figures from 1994–1998, 
including both prostheses and orthoses from 
all nine orthopedic centers, show a constant 
increase in P/O outputs when POWER was 
directly involved in the orthopedic activities. 
This followed a projected 10 percent increase 
under the POWER/MISAU agreement. How-
ever, during the last period 1999–2000, the 
total capacity for P/O services dropped by an 
average of 23.3 percent (see general statistics 
in Appendix E). 
Existing Human Resources in P/O  
A total of 106 people work in the nine ortho-
pedic centers managed by the SMFR-MISAU. 
The following chart outlines the numbers of, 
classification for, and salaries of these people. 
 
 
Number 
 
Categories 
 
Training 
Salary Range 
(monthly) 
1 Head of O/P SMFR-MISAU O/P technology, Bachelor of Science 
(BSc) 
more than: $165 
21 (*) Orthopedic technologists 
Cat. 2 / ISPO  
three-year diploma O/P technology,  
ICRC-ISPO  
minimum: $95  
maximum: $165 USD 
30 Orthopedic technicians 
Cat. 3 / ISPO 
less than two-year certificate on-the-job 
training ICRC-POWER 
minimum: $75 
maximum: $112  
34 Bench workers 
(Category 3) 
leather, metal, wood, plastic on-the-job 
training  
minimum: $47 
maximum: $75  
18 Assistants helpers and cleaners within the lowest range 
2 Administrators office work within the medium range 
(*) Presently, five orthopedic technologists are not producing devices. Three are attending a three-year (BSc), Cat.1. course in 
France and will return in July 2001. Two are attending a four-year (Master of Science [MSc]) degree program for orthopedic 
engineers in Scotland. They will return in 2003.  
 
The developing country norms in P/O ser-
vices suggest that qualified orthopedic tech-
nologists (Category II) assisted by orthopedic 
technicians (Category III) should have the 
capacity to deliver at least six prostheses and 
six orthoses per month. Therefore, the poten-
tial capacity for Mozambique should be about 
1,056 prostheses and 1,056 orthoses a year 
(including one month annual leave for staff 
and work handled by the five absent tech- 
nicians). Time needed to repair ortho- 
pedic appliances is not considered in this  
calculation because orthopedic technicians  
(Category III) and bench workers can per-
form these duties without lowering the over-
all production numbers. During the last  
two years, production figures from all nine 
centers were 2.5 times (150 percent) lower 
than Mozambique’s potential production  
capacity. 
Mozambique has 122 physiotherapists and 
physiotherapy assistants operating out of the 
district and provincial hospitals and distrib-
uted in the nine orthopedic centers and 39 
hospitals in the country.  
Patrick J. Leahy War Victims Fund 
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Causes and Problems of Low 
Capacity in Prosthetics and  
Orthotics Activities  
Many factors have contributed to the decline 
in overall production quantity and quality:  
• Five orthopedic technologists left to at-
tend upgrading courses in 1998 and 1999 
and three other quit 
• POWER management support was phased 
out in 1998 
• Floods in 1999 and 2000 affected the sup-
plies of materials and patients access to 
P/O services 
However, these factors do not explain all the 
deficiencies of the current situation. Other 
significant factors include the following: 
1. Structure and Responsibility of the 
MISAU 
Understandably, the MISAU’s priority is 
preventive and curative medicine pro-
grams. It allocates little or no attention or 
resources to physical rehabilitation pro-
grams. Under current procedures, there is 
a constant turnover of upper-level manag-
ers and directors at both the hospitals and 
the ministry. This change of personnel has 
thwarted the introduction and progress of 
necessary changes.  
The sole full-time employee of the 
SMFR-MISAU, the director, is responsi-
ble for co-ordinating all P/O activities, but 
he has no real authority. SMFR occupies a 
small office without adequate staff or 
budget. Plans of action and recommenda-
tions from oversight visits are often de-
layed or hindered by the complex bu-
reaucracy of the MISAU, under which the 
SMFR operates. Communication is poor 
and the system, thus far, has operated in-
efficiently. Although he is obstructed by 
bureaucracy, even in an optimal environ-
ment the head of SSMFR has neither the 
leadership skills nor the initiative to effec-
tively co-ordinate the national and provin-
cial hospital P/O workshops.  
2. Deficiencies in the Development of P/O 
Services 
The team’s discussions with national- and 
provincial-level players (MISAU, DNSA, 
DAM, SMFR, and MMCAS) in Maputo, 
Inhambane, Beira, and Quelimane con-
firmed that P/O services need to be im-
proved. However, such improvements can 
not and will not be accomplished without 
additional financial and technical support. 
The SMFR-MISAU believes that they 
cannot change the current situation with-
out more external funding. However, the 
team found that existing problems are sys-
temic and do not necessarily require addi-
tional financial resources.  
3. Other Problems 
• Lack of patients due to transporta-
tion problems. Transportation, under 
the responsibility and coordination 
of the Ministry of Women and Coor-
dination of Social Action has been 
unreliable and not well coordinated. 
Even when POWER negotiated 
agreements and payments directly to 
MMCAS, transportation was not be-
ing provided. 
• Lack of staff motivation. Some centers 
experienced high absenteeism and in 
almost all centers staff members 
rushed off to second and third jobs as 
soon as the day was complete (or even 
before). Staff salaries are low and con-
tribute to low productivity. The work-
ing environment at the centers is poor 
and in some cases dangerous. These 
factors all contributed to the poor 
quality of P/O services. 
• Low production of components.  
Machinery has broken down and has 
not been repaired. As a result, the cen-
ters have not produced enough, feet, 
knee joints, and crutches. 
• Lack of human and material resources. 
The system does not have a cost re-
covery mechanism and the budget al-
location from MISAU is not suffi-
cient. Current staff members do not 
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have the requisite skills to handle the 
responsibilities of their positions. Un-
der qualified staff are allowed to treat 
patients and provide services they do 
not have the skills to provide. 
• Lack of proper logistics and supplies. 
The MISAU central warehouse is un-
derstaffed and transportation to the 
provinces is lacking. Vehicles pur-
chased for use under the rehabilitation 
program are used for other medical 
purposes and their use is not coordi-
nated. 
• Communication between all depart-
ments and staff is poor. 
Patient Accessibility to Prosthetic 
and Orthotic Services 
One of the crucial problems with Mozam-
bique’s P/O services is the patients’ lack of 
accessibility to those services. Through it’s 
provincial branches, the Ministry of Social 
Affairs (MMCAS) is the office tasked with 
identifying, registering, transporting, and ac-
commodating the disabled from the districts 
as well as following up after service delivery. 
The MMCAS implements the services 
through its provincial departments (DPAS-
PAI and SIRT units). 
In Beira and Quelimane, POWER provides 
$23,000 per year in financial support to 
MMCAS, which is about $2.5 per patient a day 
for food and lodging and $25 for transporta-
tion. Little is achieved. In Maputo, Quelimane, 
Beira, and Inhambane, no vehicles are avail-
able to transport patients and alternative meth-
ods of transportation have not been identified. 
The team met many patients who had been at 
the transit center for several weeks but had not 
yet visited the orthopedic center, despite the 
fact that the center was less than 5km from the 
transit center. The car, it was reported, had 
been broken for one year. MMCAS had not 
reported this problem to POWER. 
The transit centers the team visited were far 
from full capacity. In many places, the rooms 
were occupied more by poor and destitute 
people than by disabled people. Some rooms 
are also rented but there is not a realistic cost 
recovery system.  
The ministry (MMCAS-DPAS) does not pro-
vide a budget for or maintenance of the transit 
centers. The centers are therefore forced to 
“fundraise” on their own. In Quelimane, for 
example, where POWER negotiated an 
agreement to reimburse the transportation and 
food/lodging costs for people being served at 
the rehabilitation center, MMCAS uses the 
money to feed and house all the people at the 
center, including the poor and elderly. In the 
Quelimane transit center, the poor and elderly 
far outnumber the people awaiting services at 
the orthopedic center. As a result, the disabled 
report receiving only two meals a day consist-
ing solely of beans and rice. Conditions at this 
transit center are extremely basic. People re-
port staying up to four months. Coordination 
between the DPAS-MMCAS and SMFR-
MISAU for transportation and follow-up vis-
its to disabled people appears difficult. In 
general, patients visited in different transit 
centers were not satisfied. 
Staff Performance, Motivation,  
and Oversight 
The evaluation team assumed that the P/O 
technicians working in the workshops were 
technically acquainted with fabrication meth-
odologies and procedures because they have 
had many years of experience and most had 
attended more than one training event. Yet, 
the team found the quality of job performance 
was poor in all the places they visited (with 
exception of Quelimane, where the quality 
was fair). The team noted careless mistakes, 
like improperly assembling components, dur-
ing visits. 
In Maputo, the team saw patients whose pros-
theses had not been fitted properly but who 
had been discharged and counted as success-
ful outcomes. The team was told that techni-
cian assistants (Category 3, the lowest) are 
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permitted to see and treat patients, duties 
normally assigned only to orthopedic tech-
nologists who are Category 2 and above. The 
center supervisor indicated that quality con-
trol procedures were in place and imple-
mented. However, the team saw numerous, 
poor-quality devices being used by patients 
that had been discharged. 
The orthopedic workshops the team visited 
were not busy. Absenteeism and unmotivated 
staff was often noticed. The orthopedic work-
shop of Inhambane had neither patients nor 
prostheses. 
Productivity in general was low in the work-
shops the team visited. In Maputo, six ortho-
pedic technicians who are eligible (and sup-
posed) to retire are permitted to work 
“moderately” instead. The MISAU’s staff 
salaries, like those of other government de-
partments, are very low (between $US 75 and 
$US 165 per month) while salaries in the pri-
vate sector are double for the same level of 
staff. Staff members note that transportation 
alone represents a significant expenses (up to 
$US 10 per month).  
Regardless of the poor the salaries they re-
ceive, the technician’s practice of discharging 
patients with poorly fitted prostheses—in 
some cases so poor as to cause injury—is un-
justifiable. Perhaps the larger question relates 
to job satisfaction and whether or not the 
technicians are truly happy coming to their 
workplace every day. Indeed, most of the 
technicians the team met are either studying 
in a different field or working at night in an 
unrelated position.  
Although all P/O centers are formally part of 
the provincial or district hospital system, hos-
pital directors are not involved in the services. 
The directors state that they are not involved 
because they have limited time and ortho- 
pedics is not a priority. Recommendations  
and follow-up reports from POWER and 
SMFR monitoring trips, therefore, receive 
little or no consideration and, as a result, have 
no impact.  
Necessary maintenance for machinery and 
building is severely lacking. Consequently, 
workshop conditions are declining rapidly.  
Technology Used and Quality of 
Prosthetics and Orthotics Services 
In the early 1990s, ICRC introduced the tech-
niques and materials necessary to locally pro-
duce polypropylene components. The ortho-
pedic center in Maputo was modified to 
include a workshop to produce components. 
The Maputo center produces components for 
all centers in Mozambique.  
The Maputo center employs seven bench 
workers to produce and assemble feet, knee 
joints, alignment components, crutches, and 
other small parts. Despite being well equipped 
and stocked, the center’s present production 
capacity is only 40 feet, 10 knee joints, and 15 
crutches per month—only enough to meet the 
needs of the Maputo central workshop.  
The same pattern of negligence and poor con-
ditions the team saw throughout the country 
were also evident in this workshop. For in-
stance, the injection machine used to produce 
plastic parts for crutches and prostheses has 
been out of use for more than three months 
because the brass nozzle had not been fixed. 
This is a fairly minor repair. Therefore, in-
jected plastic handles for crutches cannot be 
produced. Instead of repairing the injection 
machine, the workshop reverted to producing 
poor-quality metal crutches.  
Unnecessarily, this workshop is heavily 
equipped with tools and machinery (e.g., four 
different types of lathe machines) from which 
it is possible to reproduce very sophisticated 
spare parts. In spite of this fact, the feet pro-
duced are too stiff (they cannot flex when the 
patient is walking) and badly shaped by hand. 
Knee joint components are poor: the metal 
tube supporting the knee axis is too weak and 
the bushings wear out quickly. Furthermore, 
the workshop is quite disorganized. Although 
staff members are allocated to departments 
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and by level, there is either little division of 
labor or staff members are used inappropri-
ately and ineffectively. The workshop is 
costly to maintain and the quality of work-
manship is poor. 
HI/France Technology and Its 
Acceptance by the MISAU 
In the early 1990s, HI/France initiated the use 
of polyvalent technology in the workshops in  
Inhambane, Lichinga, Tete, Pemba, and 
Vilanculos. It was introduced as “appropriate 
technology.” The principles of this technol-
ogy consist of producing orthopedic appli-
ances at the lowest cost using local materials 
available and with minimally trained staff. 
The professional P/O community has not gen-
erally accepted this technology. 
Under HI advisement, the SMFR-MISAU of-
ficially accepted this standard, adapted it 
slightly and designated it “improved appro-
priate technology.” By professional standards, 
this type of limb should only be used as a 
temporary device or as basic walking aids.  
The team evaluated an example of this tech-
nique in Inhambane and Manjacase where the 
Jaipur Limb Campaign, in cooperation with the 
Mozambique Red Cross, trained workers for 
three months in India. The devices produced 
were made by combining a mixture of materi-
als (not well matched) such as aluminium, 
metal, plastic, wood, and leather with an im-
provised type of foot. The resulting foot ap-
peared to be poor and often inappropriate. 
Moreover, although this technique was touted 
as using locally available materials, and thus 
appropriate technology, in reality about 70 
percent of the materials used to produce these 
devices need to be imported from places such 
as South Africa, India, China, or Maputo. As a 
result the cost of such devices and the time 
needed to fabricate them may be about the 
same as the cost of and time needed to produce 
the more durable polypropylene prosthesis. 
SMFR-MISAU Budget 
The MISAU’s budget is 70 percent funded by 
foreign sources and represents only 12 per-
cent of the total national budget.  
In 2001, the SMFR proposed a budget of 
$219,015 to cover the cost of imported mate-
rials. This amount represents MISAU’s 30 
percent share. The rest of the costs were to be 
covered by HI (20 percent) and POWER (50 
percent). A close look at the budget plan 
showed an additional $81,237 needed for or-
thopedic and physiotherapy services at the 10 
workshops, this amount included running 
costs of offices, stationery, small items, staff 
trips within the provinces, and communica-
tion expenditures. The budget did not include 
salaries or expenditures for the orthopedic 
workshops, which instead are directly in-
cluded in the respective provincial/district 
hospital budget. Some orthopedic appliances 
and crutches are also sold in hospitals for 
“special attendance patients” as allowed by 
the MISAU. The selling prices of these items 
range from $37 to $109 for prostheses, from 
$2 to $68 for orthoses, and $3 for a pair of 
crutches. The selling prices are not based on a 
realistic cost calculation system but are in-
stead viewed as a patient contribution. Based 
on collected information, the SMFR-MISAU 
national budget for physical rehabilitation (in-
cluding physiotherapy) can be estimated at 
between $480,000 and $500,000 per year. 
Materials, Purchases, Supplies,  
and Logistics of SMFR/MISAU 
Since 1998, when POWER’s roles and re-
sponsibilities were changed to advisory, the 
project has experienced significant difficulties 
in importing and dispatching materials to the 
provinces. Customs procedures within the 
government of Mozambique are extremely 
long and complicated and even within 
MISAU several different departments are in-
volved in this process. As a result, consign-
ments of materials often remain in customs 
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for several months before they are received at 
the national MISAU warehouse.  
The team visited the national MISAU ware-
house where all hospital equipment and sup-
plies are stored and shipped for the entire 
country. Incredibly, the warehouse has only 
four employees to handle all stocking func-
tions for the health care needs of the entire 
country. These employees state that they are 
overwhelmed. This appears to be a gross un-
derstatement. 
For the P/O sector, components for orthopedic 
devices are stored in one small area. Although 
some stock was visible, several of the provin-
cial centers visited noted that they had been 
waiting up to six months for supplies. In one 
center, they stated that they had not received 
crutches for two years!  
The management of stock at the warehouse 
and the coordination with logistics and sup-
plies departments (Directorate for Admini-
stration and Management of Ministry of 
Health, Logistics of Ministry of Health, 
Technical Department of Logistics, and Na-
tional Center for Supplies of Ministry of 
Health) within the MISAU are inefficient. 
During the grant agreement, POWER occa-
sionally used the services of an independent 
contractor or other NGO to distribute sup-
plies. On more than one occasion, in order  
to get supplies moving at all, POWER of-
fered to pay the costs of shipping supplies to 
the provinces through an independent con-
tractor. Unfortunately, the SMFR/MISAU 
declined and the provincial workshop went 
without necessary orthopedic supplies and 
materials. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
The situation with regard to P/O services in 
Mozambique clearly suggests that the MISAU 
cannot sustain P/O program activities in such 
a way that the services can meet the needs of 
the country’s population. Difficulties include 
poor staff performance, an inefficient system 
for supplying materials to the workshops, the 
lack of a cost recovery system, poor to satis-
factory quality prostheses produced, lack of 
proper communication between the different 
ministry departments, and no established 
standard of quality with regard to the fit of 
prostheses and the delivery of services in gen-
eral. Since the SMFR-MISAU assumed direct 
responsibility for P/O services in 1999, the 
capacity for delivering prostheses in the nine 
orthopedic centers is about 2.5 times (150 
percent) lower than the available capacity 
(451 prostheses delivered versus a capacity to 
deliver 1,056 per year) and the combined out-
put of prostheses and orthoses dropped by 24 
percent. Moreover, the following findings and 
recommendations are made. 
1. Quality of P/O Supplies and Services 
Patient accessibility to P/O services is 
poor, and when services are available, 
they have not generally been of acceptable 
quality. Although finances and materials 
have affected in the quality and quantity 
of services, a number of other factors such 
as staff motivation, adequate and appro-
priate management, training and technical 
assistance, and selection of technology 
have also played a decisive part.  
The projects in Manjacaze and Quelimane 
are good examples of the effect of such 
other factors. The JLC-MRCS project in 
Manjacaze (Gaza province) is independ-
ent from the MISAU and sufficiently 
funded. Facilities are new and expansive. 
However, the quality of devices produced 
at this site was not any better than those 
seen at the other centers. On the other 
hand, in the Quelimane orthopedic work-
shop, part of the MISAU system, the con-
ditions were poor, equipment limited, and 
supplies sporadic, but the few prostheses 
provided to amputees were of decent qual-
ity. This success was in great part due to 
the dedication of the staff; the manage-
ment provided by the workshop manager, 
Arlindo Setavane; and the oversight given 
by the hospital director, Dr. Elena F. Mula 
Chong.  
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2. Local Production of Orthopedic Com-
ponents in Maputo 
Local production of components in Ma- 
puto has been fraught with problems. The 
system, as it stands now, is neither efficient 
nor effective and should be changed. The 
fabrication process involves extremely 
technical issues and high expenditures. 
This process should not be run as simply 
ancillary to an orthopedic workshop.  
The 20-year-long experience of the ICRC, 
as a pioneer in this field, has proven (with 
the exception of production of crutches) 
that locally produced components are not 
the best approach in P/O programs. The 
ICRC found that the programs failed be-
cause they were not sustainable in quality, 
quantity, and in cost as compared to the 
more affordable, centrally fabricated im-
ported components available today. As 
such, the ICRC has chosen to outsource 
all production of components for prosthet-
ics, orthotics, and wheelchairs. ICRC has 
found that it is more efficient and effec-
tive to concentrate solely on the already 
difficult objective of developing P/O  
appliances.  
The team recommends that the Maputo 
center stop fabricating components. In-
stead, serious consideration should be 
given to accessing and using the 
ICRC/Coppet components. In order to 
best be informed, a cost/benefit analysis 
should be made comparing the importa-
tion of the ICRC/Coppet components with 
in-country production. In assessing in-
country production, it should be antici-
pated that any local production would be 
outsourced to a private facility and not 
done with the SMFR/MISAU system. 
3. POWER’s Proposal for a Not-for- 
Profit NGO Managing P/O Services in  
Mozambique 
The initiative proposed by POWER for an 
independent NGO or institution to manage 
P/O services for disabled people enjoys 
wide and varied support and should be 
explored further. The challenge, however, 
will be great. In the team debriefing with 
the vice-minister of Health, the govern-
ment of Mozambique expressed optimism 
that the minister himself would welcome 
such an initiative.  
Since POWER has already worked out an 
alliance with ADEMO (local association 
of the disabled) and created the Council 
for Action on Disability (CAD), there are 
a number different options that POWER 
could explore. Three options were dis-
cussed with the vice-minister of Health 
and the evaluation team. There are still 
many outstanding issues and agreements 
to be made before engaging. For example, 
there is the issue of how to deal with staff 
and donated equipment belonging to the 
MISAU centers. How will this be re-
solved? What if the recommendation was 
to sell excess equipment? Could this be 
done? Other outstanding matters include 
what type of agreement to create with one 
(ADEMO) or many local partners and 
what method to use to build sustainability 
into the programs.  
POWER should not have more than two 
partners or too many different types of ac-
tivities associated with this project, at 
least until it has made solid roots. If 
POWER expands this initiative too 
broadly it will implode with management 
and administrative problems and will cre-
ate a structure that is difficult to control.  
4. Conditions for Sustainability of Future 
Programs (as proposed in the in-
country debriefing)  
The following four principles determine 
the potential sustainability of any project: 
1. Patient accessibility to P/O services 
How: 
• Refund part or all of the costs of trans-
portation and accommodation for poor 
disabled 
• Use available local transportation and 
accommodation possibilities (pension 
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family, church, shelters, etc.) and do 
not try to create these services within 
the same P/O activities  
Who:  
• Find/Develop an agreement with 
NGOs, private sources, or insurances 
companies  
2. Existence of cost recovery and in-
come-generating mechanisms 
How:  
• Establish real cost calculations of all 
products supplied and/or services 
(physiotherapy)  
• Include small profit (10 percent) and 
contingencies (9 percent) (to be made 
by external financial audit) 
• Making sell prices available for pri-
vate clients and for outsource donors 
or insurances 
Who: 
• Provide services free for disabled war 
victims and poor disabled, but the 
costs for these services must be reim-
bursed by NGOs or donors or by small 
government participation  
3. Staff performance under qualification 
and motivation 
How: 
• Improve salaries for qualified and 
committed staff  
• Provide advantages for staff transpor-
tation, training, or other possibilities 
• Improve working conditions and envi-
ronment (clean and attractive set up of 
facilities) 
Who:  
• Implementing agency (POWER) with 
NGO and donors support 
4. Quality of P/O supplies and services 
How:  
• Provide choice and satisfaction to all 
disabled (poor and other)  
• Do not produce components locally 
but purchase the most affordable im-
ported quality products (possible deals 
with manufacturers, suppliers, and in-
ternational agencies or donors) 
• Establish a database listing informa-
tion on disabled people and collect 
relevant information for donors 
• Follow up and survey patients serviced 
Who:  
• The implementing agency 
Three Options for Future 
POWER/MISAU Collaboration  
Based on ICRC’s work in Ethiopia and else-
where in Africa the following three options 
should be considered with regard to collabo-
ration between POWER and the MISAU: 
1. P/O services under an independent 
structure  
This structure might be an institution or 
NGO (CAD). It would have a board, a 
chairman, and representatives from differ-
ent agencies (ADEMO, Private VIP, 
MRCS, associations, MISAU, MMCAS, 
etc.). The board would appoint a director 
and administrator for the orthopedic center. 
In the orthopedic center, the person in 
charge, the chief, should be a Category 1 
prosthetist/orthotist. This person would be 
in charge not only of services, but also of 
quality assurance/control in all respective 
departments. All P/O activities and ser-
vices should contain a cost-recovery ele-
ment and an income-generation mecha-
nism based on real cost calculations. The 
Ministry of Defence, insurance companies, 
NGO, or other donors would reimburse the 
real costs to the center for P/O services. 
CAD    Board    P/O Center: Director/Administrator 
2. P/O services remain under the respon-
sibility of the MISAU but with full 
autonomy  
Under this option, the center has its own 
board (chairman and representatives of 
MISAU, MMCAS, MRCS, and others). 
The orthopedic center has a director and 
administrator appointed by the board. 
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The MISAU will guarantee national 
standards and a minimum salary to the 
staff and all P/O activities. Services pro-
vided must contain cost recovery and in-
come-generation elements sufficient, at 
least, to cover salaries and maintenance. 
The Ministry of Defence, insurance com-
panies, NGO, or other donors would re-
imburse the real costs to the center for 
P/O services.  
MISAU    P/O Center Board: Director/Administrator 
3. P/O services are entirely under the 
commercial private sector  
This option could be developed in addition 
to or in combination with options 1 and 2. 
This option should not be excluded as it of-
fers particular advantages, especially for 
difficult cases. MISAU is encouraged to 
permit and support the private sector’s par-
ticipation in the delivery of P/O services. 
In all cases, small units of P/O services 
should remain under the responsibility of 
MISAU hospitals for medical purpose. 
These P/O units should be attached to 
physiotherapy departments and be limited 
to delivering small orthopedic appliances, 
such as temporary prostheses. 
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Appendix A – Vice-Minister of Health’s  
Debriefing on the Assessment of the 
POWER/Mozambique Program 
1. Context of the Visit (Leahy War Vic-
tims Fund [LWVF]) 
a. Began in 1989. It is a program within 
USAID that provides a dedicated 
source of financial and technical as-
sistance for civilian victims of war. 
“Victims” are persons who suffer 
from mobility related injuries, includ-
ing those injured by land-mines and 
those who suffer from polio as a re-
sult of interrupted immunization cam-
paigns.  
b. LWVF supports programs that pro-
vide for the improved mobility of 
people with disabilities by providing 
accessible, appropriate orthopros-
thetic services. Focus is on quality, 
availability, accessibility, and sus-
tainability. The Fund also supports 
rehabilitation-related services such as 
orthopedic surgery and physiotherapy 
and works to improve the social and 
economic integration of people with 
disabilities. 
c. In the last 12 years, the LWVF has 
provided more than $70 million in 
more than 16 countries. 
2. The LWVF and Rehabilitation in  
Mozambique 
a. Mozambique was one of the first 
countries supported under the LWVF. 
The program of assistance began in 
1989 through support to the ICRC. In 
addition to providing support to the 
ICRC, the Fund has provided support 
to Handicap International (HI), Save 
the Children (for the construction of 
the transit centers in Maputo and 
Beira), and POWER. The total LWVF 
investment in the rehabilitation sector 
in Mozambique is approximately 
$10.2 million. 
b. The POWER program in Mozambique 
began in 1996. In collaboration with 
the ministry, it was decided that 
POWER would assist four centers for-
merly supported by the ICRC. 
Namely, Maputo, Beira, Quelimane, 
and Nampula. 
c. As a result of work done by Handicap 
International to centralize services and 
recommendations by a USAID team, 
the activities were fully handed over 
to the Ministry of Health in 
1998/1999. Since that time, within its 
partnership with the Ministry of 
Health, POWER has played only a 
cursory advisory role and provided fi-
nancial assistance for the manufacture 
of orthoprosthetic components. 
d. The current partnership between 
POWER and the Ministry of Health 
(and other partners) ends at the end of 
the year. With the end of the program 
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close at hand, this assessment was de-
vised to (1) evaluate project impact 
since 1998; (2) help develop a close-
out and sustainability plan; (3) deter-
mine what assistance, if any, the 
LWVF could/should provide in the fu-
ture for rehabilitation in Mozambique; 
and (4) suggest/recommend possible 
options for such an assistance pack-
age, if determined appropriate. 
3. Assessment Team and Itinerary 
a. The team consisted of the following 
individuals: 
i. Health economist from the U.K., 
looking at feasibility of pub-
lic/private sector involvement 
ii. Joe Ubiedo, CPO and ICRC 
Technical Director. 
iii. Rob Horvath, LWVF 
iv. Donna Carpenter, USAID/Mozam- 
bique 
v. Max Denu, POWER 
vi. Francisco Baptista, Head of SMFR 
vii. Representative, with PAI at the 
MMCAS 
b. The team visited the following sites: 
i. Maputo Orthopedic Center and 
general hospital 
ii. Manjance Orthopedic Center, sup-
ported by Mozambique Red Cross 
iii. Inhambane Orthopedic Center and 
general hospital, formerly sup-
ported by Handicap International. 
Also visited the MMCAS transit 
center. 
iv. Beira Orthopedic Center and gen-
eral hospital (and MMCAS transit 
center) 
v. Quelimane Orthopedic Center and 
general hospital (and MMCAS 
transit center) 
vi. Also met with Dr. Candido, Dr. 
Mengele, and Dr. Tomo (deputy 
director of the Dept. of Planning 
and Cooperation)  
4. Starting point: Miller/Whitson and the 
status of activities in 1997/98 
a. Country moved from emergency/hu- 
manitarian relief to development 
b. Recommendations were that the MOH 
assume responsibility for services. 
This has been done and the MOH cur-
rently pays all recurring cost. Finances 
come from within the hospital’s budg-
ets. POWER (donor) pays only the 
costs of materials. In a sense, the pro-
gram has reached a level of financial 
sustainability. However, as findings 
indicate there is little or no managerial 
and/or technical sustainability in most 
centers. 
c. The centralization of services has led 
to a large decline in both quality and 
quantity of services. 
5. General Findings. Joe provide more 
details depending on Vice-Minister’s 
wishes. 
a. Materials purchased and/or fabri- 
cated with outside resources are not 
getting to the centers. Sometimes cen-
ters wait more than six months from 
time of order. In one center, no 
crutches were available for almost 
two years. 
b. With the exception of one center 
(Quelimane), the quality of the de-
vices produced was poor to very bad. 
The lack of materials had an affect on 
the quantity of services. However, 
quality issues were more directly re-
lated to staff, despite seemingly ade-
quate skill levels and the existence of 
supervision. 
c. Although supervision and oversight 
visits were made, the visits and subse-
quent reports have had little or no ef-
fect on service delivery.  
d. Hospitals take little or no interest in the 
delivery of quality services. There are 
many higher priority issues. Staff prob-
lems/issues are not addressed. Mainte-
nance is not done. Existing space is in-
Patrick J. Leahy War Victims Fund 
18 
adequate and often what does exist is 
reallocated for departments. 
e. Many trained staff members have de-
parted. Those at the centers work half-
heartedly. 
f. Work and service delivery environ-
ment is unappealing and depressing. 
g. Production had declined by more than 
40 percent. 
h. Demand for services has declined, as 
much to do with poor service as with 
accessibility. 
6. Options 
a. Components 
i. Continue to manufacture in coun-
try – quality and quantity produced 
are inadequate. Maputo center 
should not continue to manufac-
ture and deliver services. They are 
unable to do this effectively. 
ii. Purchase/import – Coppet or others 
iii. Need to conduct a full cost analysis 
iv. Comment on Manjacaze (and HI 
approach); supposedly “local” 
components. In reality, they im-
port as much as any other center. 
b. Service Delivery – regardless of deliv-
ery mechanism, LWVF can and will 
only support quality services that are 
delivered in reasonable quantity. 
i. Services remain totally integrated 
within the hospital and MOH sys-
tems. From centers visited, only 
Quelimane would be eligible for 
LWVF assistance. 
ii. Orthopedic center managed by 
separate board but still within 
MOH perview. 
iii. Management contract outsourced 
to NGO/association/foundation. 
iv. Privatization. 
7. Next Steps 
a. Decision taken on possible options. 
May be more than one option.  
b. If new option, bring team back to de-
velop detailed business and implemen-
tation plan. Initial visit of one to two 
weeks, followed by individual visits. 
c. Selection of implementation site and 
development of phase-in plan. May 
take up to six months. 
i. Includes negotiation of roles and 
responsibilities with all players, fi-
nancial commitments, exit plan 
should be built in from the begin-
ning, etc. 
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Appendix B – Assessment of POWER’s Program  
and Feasibility Study on Charitable Not-for-Profit 
Organization Managing P/O Services 
Term of reference for Orthoprosthetic Technical Evaluation 
Purpose: Evaluate POWER’s accomplishments under the two cooperative agreements funded by 
USAID.  
Provide recommendations on how to ensure sustainability of prosthetics services in Mozambique 
after the end of USAID assistance in December 2001.  
I. Responsibilities 
a. The CPO technical expert will work in 
coordination with the team  
b. The CPO technical expert will collect 
the technical information described 
below. 
c. The CPO technical expert will present 
to the team a technical report, which 
shall include the final evaluation re-
sults and recommendations. 
2. Assessment of current situation  
a. Production statistics  
i. Capacity 
ii. Actual  
iii. Changes with handback to MOH  
iv. Reasons  
b. Human resources issues  
i. In-country capacity 
ii. Motivation, career path, salary  
issues  
c. Service delivery issues  
i. Patient awareness of service avail-
ability  
ii. Patient access: transit centres, 
transport  
iii. Patient satisfaction  
iv. Service quality  
v. Costs  
d. Production, appropriate technology, 
and technical quality issues  
e. MOH preferences  
i. History (ICRC and HI) 
ii. Polyvalent technology (proposed 
by MOH) 
iii. Current technology used (manu-
facture of components and appli-
ances) 
f. Implications of patient satisfaction  
i. Comments on product offered by 
MISAU (ADEMO, ADEMIMO, 
etc.) 
ii. Comments on service the delivery 
g. Implications for sustainability  
i. Local production of components  
ii. New products to be locally devel-
oped 
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iii. Local production vs. importation 
of products 
h. Volume  
i. Production capacity and real pro-
duction 
ii. Need for the future 
i. Logistics and supplies management  
i. Current system in place/ MISAU’s 
system 
ii. Control of supplies consumption 
(central, provincial level) 
j. Supervision, monitoring and evaluation  
i. Central and Provincial levels 
ii. Implementation of Recommenda-
tion 
3. Proposals for the future  
a. Potential models per Miller and 
Whitson  
i. Workshop to serve production and 
repair of medical equipment for 
entire hospital system  
ii. Turn workshop over to private  
sector  
iii. Retain within MOH  
iv. Orthoprosthetics Implementing 
Agency  
v. Foundation  
b. Other possible models in Mozambique 
and elsewhere  
i. Advantages and disadvantages  
4. Recommendations 
a. The recommendations will cover the 
above-mentioned sections and will re-
flect an independent technical judg-
ment. 
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Appendix C – Persons Contacted 
MMCAS  
• Duarte Joaquim, National Director 
• Arthur Nhantumbo 
• Cristina Matsinhe, PAI-MMCAS 
MISAU  
• Dr. Aida Libombo, Vice-Minister of Health 
• Dr. Candido, Deputy National Director of 
Health (DNSA) and Head of Medical As-
sistance (DAM) 
• Dr. Menguele, DAM Dept. 
• Francisco Baptista, Head of SMFR-MISAU  
• Dr. Jorge Fernando M. Tomo, Deputy Na-
tional Director, Directorate of Planning 
and Co-operation 
USAID 
• David W. Hess, Deputy Director 
• Donna Carpenter, Special Projects Coor-
dinator 
Mozambican Red Cross Society 
• Texeira Fernanda, General Secretary 
Maputo Central Hospital 
• Dr. Langa, head of Orthopaedic Department 
• Carlos Passe, head of orthopaedic workshop 
ADEMO 
• Farida Gulamo, General Secretary of 
ADEMO 
Handicap International France 
• Nicolas Bordet, Director 
• Cristina Vera 
Beira (Province) 
• Dr. Americo Assane, Hospital Director of 
Beira 
• Antonia S. P. Charre, Director DPMMCAS 
• Moises Pedro Vilanculos, Head of 
orthopaedic centre  
Inhambane (Province) 
• Dr. Celia Gonçalves, Director DPS 
• Dr. Ana Paula, Hospital Director 
• Atanazio Pitore, Director DPMMCAS 
• Ricardo Romeu, Head of orthopaedic 
workshop 
Manjacaze (Province) 
• Luis Sautiane, Head of orthopaedic center 
and staff. 
• Jeronimo Ntimane, Administrator 
Quelimane (Province) 
• Dr. Helena Fernando Mula Chong, Hospi-
tal Director 
• Joana Simiao, Director DPMMCAS 
• Aarlindo Setavane, Head of orthopaedic 
workshop 
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Appendix D – Evaluation Schedule  
Date Time Action 
04/10/01 8:30 pm Arrival Joe Ubiedo in Maputo 
04/11/01 8:30 am Meeting POWER office with 
Max Deneu and Malcolm 
Murray 
 10:00 
am 
Meeting SMFR office with 
Francisco Baptista and Mal-
colm Murray 
 11:00 
am 
Visit of the CRIM (Children 
Project in Malanghalene, 
Maputo) 
 2:30 pm Meeting with Texeira Fer-
nanda, MRCS office 
04/12/01 8:00 am Visit of the orthopaedic center 
of Maputo Hospital 
 10:00 
am 
Meeting with Francisco Bap-
tista 
 1:00 pm Meeting with Duarte Joaquim 
and Cristina Matsinhe, MMCAS 
office 
 4:00 pm Meeting with H.I. 
04/13/01 8:00 am Discussions with Max Deneu 
and Malcolm Murray, POWER 
office 
 12:00 
am 
Lunch with Donna Carpenter 
USAID, Max Deneu and Mal-
colm Murray 
04/14/01  Arrival of Rob Horvath in 
Maputo, USAID 
04/15/01  Day off 
04/16/01 8:00 am Briefing meeting POWER office 
with the team 
04/16/01 11:30 
am 
Meeting with Dr Candido and 
Dr Menguele, at MISAU office 
 2:00 pm Meeting with team POWER 
office 
04/17/01 6:00 am Departure to Manjacase by 
road 
 10:30 
am 
Visit of the JLC-MRCS ortho-
paedic center 
 7:30 pm Arrival in Maputo 
04/18/01 8:30 am Meeting at orthopaedic center 
of Maputo Hospital 
 1:00 pm Evaluation visit of the ortho-
paedic center, Maputo Hospital 
  continued 
Date Time Action 
 2:00 pm Continuation of meeting with 
Carlos Passa, Head of ortho-
paedic center 
 4:00 pm POWER office 
04/19/01 8:00 am Meeting with David W. Hess 
and Donna Carpenter, USAID 
office 
 12:30 
pm 
Meeting with Francisco Bap-
tista at SMFR office 
 4:30 pm POWER office 
04/20/01 8:00 am Flight to Inhambane 
 9:30 am Meeting with Celia Gonçalves, 
DPS, and visit of the ortho-
paedic workshop and physio-
therapy at hospital of Inham-
bane 
 2:00 pm Meeting with Director at office 
of DPMMCAS and visit of tran-
sit center of Inhambane 
 6:00 pm Arrival in Maputo 
04/21/01  Day off 
04/22/01 2:00 pm Departure to Beira by air 
 5:00 pm arrival to Beira 
04/23/01 7:30 am Visit of the orthopaedic center 
and physiotherapy at Beira 
hospital 
 2:00 pm Meeting with Antonia Charre, 
DPMMCAS, office 
 2:30 pm Visit of transit center in Beira 
 4:00 pm Meeting with Dr Americo 
Assan, Director of Beira  
Hospital 
04/24/01 7:00 am Departure to Quelimane 
 9:30 am Visit of the orthopaedic work-
shop in Quelimane 
 11:00 
am 
Meeting with Helena F. Mula 
Chong, Director of Quelimane 
Hospital 
 2:30 pm Visit of the transit center in 
Quelimane 
 4:00 pm Meeting with Johana Simao, 
Director of DPS in Quelimane 
 4:30 pm Meeting at orthopaedic work-
shop 
  continued 
Orthoprosthetic Technical Assessment of POWER’s Programs 
23 
Date Time Action 
 10:30 
pm 
Arrival in Maputo 
04/25/01 9:00 am Meeting with Donna Carpen-
ter, USAID office 
 10:00 
am 
Visit of the national warehouse 
of the MISAU 
 11:00 
am 
Visit of the transit center in 
Maputo 
 2:00 pm Meeting with Dr. Langa, 
Maputo hospital 
 3:00 pm Meeting with Dr Jorge Fer-
nando, Deputy Director of 
Cupertino and Plan of MISAU 
04/26/01 11:30 
am 
Meeting with Dr Menguele, 
MISAU office 
 3:00 pm Meeting with Dr Aida Libombo, 
Vice Minister of MISAU 
 
